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SOUTH CAROLINA ANALYSIS OF IMPEDIMENTS TO FAIR HOUSING 




“Predatory lending” is a general label for a wide variety of practices and loan terms that are 
harmful to the borrower. Predatory loan practices and terms run the gamut of legal and 
fraudulent activities, making it difficult for the consumer finance industry, regulators and 
advocates to agree on a definition of predatory lending. Because abusive lenders can be creative 
about devising new predatory tactics, it is even difficult to catalog predatory lending practices. 
The complexity of the issue also presents a challenge to consumers trying to avoid the excessive 
expense and greater risk of foreclosure or bankruptcy associated with predatory lending. 
Predatory lending is concentrated in the subprime lending market that rapidly expanded in 
the1990s (from 104,000 loans in 1993 to almost a million in 1998 (Unequal Burden, 2000).  
The subprime market offers loans at premium prices to borrowers who represent a higher credit 
risk than borrowers in the prime market because they have poor credit histories or high debt 
relative to income. Some characteristics of the subprime market create opportunities for abusive 
lending practices that disproportionately affect low-income minority and elderly populations. 
Subprime mortgages may be a first mortgage (to purchase or refinance a home), a second 
mortgage or a home equity line of credit. Most often the mortgage is for debt consolidation or 
general consumer credit but they are also used for home improvement. In addition to higher risk, 
subprime mortgages generally have lower loan amounts, higher origination costs and faster 
repayments. (HUD-Treasury, 2000).  
To distinguish predatory loans from risk-based subprime lending, analysts recommend 
reviewing both the terms of the loan and the practices of the lender. Predatory loans are more 
likely to include excessive fees, prepayment penalties, large balloon payments, negative 
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amortization or high cost credit insurance. Predatory lending practices can include high-pressure 
tactics, lying, misrepresentation or obscuring of loan terms to the borrower, and fraud (e.g. 
distorting borrower information on the application). The lenders also may target particular 
communities or classes of people (reverse redlining). (Goldstein, 1999).  
Loan terms that are considered predatory 
? High interest rates that do not correlate with risk. Subprime loans carry higher interest 
rates than conventional loans but are considered predatory when they exceed the cost of 
risk associated with the loan or if the borrower was directed to a high risk loan when they 
would have qualified for a lower rates. Freddie Mac estimates that between 10% and 35% 
of borrowers who obtained mortgages from subprime lenders could have qualified for a 
conventional loan (Freddie Mac, 1997). 
? Yield-spread premiums. Yield spread premiums are fees paid to mortgage brokers in 
exchange for placing a borrower in a higher interest rate mortgage than the lender 
established for the loan. The broker receives the fee and lender receives the higher 
interest rate over the life of the loan (HUD-Treasury, 2000).    
? Excessive fees (fees exceeding 3-5% of the loan amount). While borrowers of 
conventional loans typically pay about 1% of the loan amount in fees, research on 
predatory lending is replete with stories of people who were charged as many as 10 
points for a loan. 
? Single premium credit insurance. Credit insurance is purchased by the borrower to 
protect loan repayment should the borrower become disabled or die. When the lender 
requires the borrower to pay for the credit insurance upfront by financing the total cost of 
the premium (a single premium) into the loan, the borrower pays interest on the premium 
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over the life of the loan (e.g. 15 –30 years) typically paying for the insurance long after 
the period of insurance coverage has expired (e.g. 5 years). In the worst cases, financing 
the insurance even hides the fact that the borrower is purchasing insurance. (Stein 2001) 
? Loan flipping. This refers to the practice of repeatedly refinancing subprime loans and 
results in the loss of equity from repeatedly incurred fees. 
? “Traps.” A number of abusive practices have been labeled “traps” because they can force 
the borrower to refinance or go into foreclosure. (Goldstein, 1999) The following 
practices are common “traps.” 
? Negative amortization or the structuring of the loan so that payments do not 
reduce interest and the principal amount of the loan increases. 
? Mandatory arbitration. Binding arbitration clauses in loan contracts limit the 
rights of the borrower (e.g. preventing participation in class action suits or 
delaying temporary or emergency relief that a court can provide and may be 
important when resolving loan disputes) and are especially abusive when the 
borrower is compelled to agree to arbitration clauses without knowledge of these 
rights or when the borrower is required to help pay for the arbitration. (HUD-
Treasury, 2000). 
? Prepayment penalties. Prepayment penalties are fees paid to lenders by borrowers 
who wish to pay the loan before the end of the loan term. These high fees (e.g. 5% 
of the loan) prevent borrowers who may need temporary credit from moving from 
high cost loans to conventional loans. (HUD-Treasury, 2000) 
? Balloon payments. Large balloon payments (as much as 85% of the loan) at the 
end of the loan period typically compel the borrower to refinance. Balloon 
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payments are especially harmful when due a short time (e.g. five years) from 
closing. 
Lender practices that are considered predatory 
Some predatory lenders engage in “reverse redlining” or aggressive targeting of high cost 
loans to classes of people, particularly elderly, low-income minorities or women who are 
financially vulnerable. Low income and African American borrowers account for a larger share 
of the subprime refinance market than the general mortgage market. The female share of 
subprime loans is also higher than that of other mortgages and subprime borrowers also tend to 
be older and less educated than prime borrowers. To the extent that these populations are 
financially vulnerable, it is not surprising that they must seek higher risk loans. But research and 
testimony suggest that risk does not fully account for their share of the subprime market. An 
analysis of Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) data documents significant racial 
disparities in subprime lending. Lower income African Americans receive 2.4 times as many 
subprime loans as lower income whites while upper income African Americans receive 3.0 times 
the number the of subprime loans as do whites of comparable incomes. (2000, Bradford).  
Similarly, low income Hispanics receive 1.4 times as many subprime loans as low income whites 
and upper income Hispanics receive 2.2 times the number of subprime loans as whites of similar 
income. In U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD)-Department of 
Treasury sponsored hearings in five metro areas in the country people testified that these groups 
had been steered to high rate/high cost loans based on race, economic status or gender. Examples 
included higher interest rate loans charged to black females than white males (U.S. v. Delta 
Funding Corporation); targeting of “house rich but income poor” elderly; targeting low income 
African American neighborhoods and other discriminatory practices (HUD-Treasury, 2000). 
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Sometimes the targeting involves home improvement scams in which a homeowner is 
sold a home repair and a mortgage refinance package (including the cost of the cost of the 
repair). The repairs may never be completed or may be poorly done but the homeowner ends up 
with an expensively refinanced mortgage to pay for it.  
 
PREDATORY LENDING AS A FAIR HOUSING ISSUE 
 
The Fair Housing Act requires equal treatment in terms and conditions of housing 
opportunities and credit regardless of race, religion, color, national origin, family status, or 
disability. The Equal Credit Opportunity Act requires equal treatment in loan terms and 
availability of credit for all of these categories as well as age, sex and marital status. When 
lenders impose fees, terms or conditions on credit that are different for some people based on 
their race, sex, age or other categories noted above they violate fair housing laws. Other 
predatory practices noted above also are discriminatory including reverse redlining, or targeting 
people (by age, race or gender) for these disadvantageous loans and steering people in these 
protected classes to more expensive loans than their credit worthiness requires or than what other 
people with similar credit receive. Hiding or failing to disclose loan terms or conditions also 
violates fair housing laws.  
THE IMPACT OF PREDATORY LENDING 
 
There is no good data on predatory lending for several reasons. The sheer variety of 
predatory activities makes them difficult to track. Many activities are not regulated and even 
those that are fall under the purview of different federal and state monitoring agencies. Short of a 
thorough examination of all consumer and mortgage loans, analysts have relied on available data 
to suggest the extent of the problem. These data have included Home Mortgage Disclosure Act 
data, foreclosure data, consumer complaints, data generated in the service of lawsuits, and 
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investigations by consumer and community advocates. The data available for South Carolina are 
very scarce. 
South Carolina’s relatively high participation in the sub-prime market makes it vulnerable to 
predatory practices. Twenty percent of South Carolinians participate in the subprime market, 
almost twice the national rate. Similarly, at almost 42%, the number of African Americans 
turning to the subprime market in South Carolina greatly exceeds the average rate of 18.6% for 
African Americans in the US. The number of low-income people turning to subprime lenders in 
South Carolina is 33.8% compared to 13.2% for the nation. Data are more available regarding 
subprime market participation in metro areas of the state than for rural areas. The Center for 
Community Change examined the conventional refinance loans for the 2000 HMDA data and 
determined that all but one (Myrtle Beach) of the Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) in South 
Carolina have subprime lending levels above the national norm of 25.31%. These MSAs include 
Sumter, Florence, Charlotte-Gastonia, Rock Hill, Columbia, Charleston-North Charleston, 
Greenville-Spartanburg-Anderson, August-Aiken . (Bradford, 2002) 
The study also calculated the percentage of subprime loans made to African-American 
borrowers in MSAs. The three MSAs in South Carolina with higher rates than the national 
average of 49.28% include Charleston-North Charleston, Columbia and Florence (55.94%). 
(Bradford, 2002) 
There have been few attempts to calculate the actual cost of specific predatory practices. The 
Coalition for Responsible Lending estimated the annual cost to U.S. households of predatory 
lending from two practices: equity stripping  (charging high fees, financing credit insurance or 
including prepayment penalties) and rate risk disparities (charging a higher rate of interest than 
credit histories would justify). Using different sources of data to estimate the cost from these 
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different activities, the study suggests that 
annually American households pay $9.1 billion 
in lost homeowner equity, penalties and excess 
interest paid. Based on South Carolina’s 2000 
share of the U.S loan volume, the estimated cost 
in South Carolina is $107 million. (Stein, 2001) 
Because foreclosures are an outcome of 
some predatory practices, some analysts examine 
foreclosure rates to understand the cost of 
predatory lending. In January 2003, the 
Charlotte Observer reported foreclosure rates 
in South Carolina hit a new high each of the first 
three quarters of 2002. The Mortgage Bankers 
Association of America's survey revealed that 
creditors were seeking to reclaim more than 9,000 S.C. homes in the quarter that ended Sept. 30. 
New foreclosures were started on subprime loans seven to nine times as often as on conventional 
prime mortgages in the Carolinas in the third quarter and the group noted its survey of subprime 
loans was not comprehensive. Research on foreclosures in large urban centers across the country 
indicate that subprime loans account for a greater rate of foreclosures than of originations and 
that the foreclosures occur sooner with subprime loans than foreclosures of other lenders. The 
practice of targeting particular communities or neighborhoods for these abusive loans potentially 
extends the cost of foreclosure beyond individuals to neighborhoods if the foreclosures are 
concentrated.  
Foreclosure in SC 
Mr. “Poe” owns a home in a rural South Carolina 
County.  He and his wife owed a mortgage with a 
balance of around $30,000 secured by the home.  Mr. 
Poe’s wife died and his health declined.  A sales person 
for a mortgage company began to visit him at home to 
attempt to convince him to refinance his mortgage.  In 
the spring of 2000, Mr. Poe was admitted to the hospital 
for treatment of heart disease.  The sales person 
continued to visit him.  Mr. Poe told her that he did not 
want to borrow more money.  The sales person persisted 
and finally got Mr. Poe to sign papers for the refinancing.  
Mr. Poe talked to his son and decided to cancel the loan 
the next day.  He sent a written notice of cancellation to 
the lender, but there was no response and he began to 
receive billings for the mortgage payments. 
 
Mr. Poe’s original mortgage had ten years of payments 
left at a fixed rate of 10.05% with a monthly payment of 
$371.  After the refinancing Mr. Poe owed a principal 
balance of $38,400 at an APR of 12.24%, and a monthly 
payment of $402.  This payment amount did not fully 
amortize the loan, and the note called for a balloon 
payment of $11, 650 at the end of fifteen years.  Due to 
his poor health and medical expenses, Mr. Poe did not 
make the mortgage payments and the eventual holder of 
the note filed a foreclosure action.   A foreclosure 
judgment was entered before Mr. Poe sought legal 
assistance.  A judicial sale has been delayed due to 
problems with the title to the property. 
 
Case from a legal services office in South Carolina. . 
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Other evidence of the problem  
Several thousand South Carolinians participated in a class action suit against a large finance 
company alleging the company broke state laws by using unfair and deceptive practices. The 
State newspaper reported that $5 million of the $484 million settlement negotiated with the 
company would be returned to South Carolinians who received loans since 1999. The South 
Carolina Attorney General’s office reports it is 
finalizing the data on who will be compensated 
and at what level. 
In March of 2002, the South Carolina 
Department of Consumer Affairs announced a 
consent settlement with a corporation regarding 
a civil action suit alleging illegal loan 
brokering. Department of Consumers Affairs 
had received complaints that the corporation 
had misrepresented services they offered when 
they offered applications for credit cards that 
were in fact secured catalogue sales cards. The 
corporation also required consumers to pay a high fee to procure the card. 
Actions taken to date within the State 
South Carolina Department of Consumer Affairs 
The South Carolina Department of Consumer Affairs reported in a newsletter dated Fall 
2001 that the number of complaints they received regarding predatory lending had increased. 
The office continues to take action against companies that violate existing lending statutes. The 
Predatory Lending “Traps” 
 
A new client was accepted recently because 
she appears to be a victim of predatory lending.  Ms. 
“Doe,” who was diagnosed several years ago with 
paranoid schizophrenia, owned her own mobile 
home.  She receives disability payments because of 
her mental illness, and owning her home is 
especially important with her limited income. 
 Some time ago, Ms. Doe’s car broke down 
and she borrowed money to have it fixed.  She 
borrowed the money from a small, local lender who 
required a lien against her home.  Ms. Doe has had 
trouble paying the loan back, and has also borrowed 
money from other local lenders, none of them banks. 
 Ms. Doe wants to file for bankruptcy to 
save her home.  After reviewing the loans, however, 
she may also have predatory lending claims against 
these lenders.  One loan agreement included 
premiums for unemployment insurance despite the 
fact that she was unemployed and on disability when 
she signed for the loan.  Another loan has been 
renewed (flipped) five times over the last two years.  
She is hunting for more of her loan contracts, which 
may contain other predatory lending practices. 
 
Case from a legal services office in South Carolina. 
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Department also has developed written and website materials to educate consumers about 
predatory practices. 
The Attorney General of South Carolina 
Attorney General Henry McMaster has expressed support in hearings and guest editorials 
for legislation that addresses predatory practices such as loan flipping, high costs or fees. 
South Carolina State Housing and Development Authority  
The South Carolina State Housing and Development Authority Homeownership Program 
reports anecdotal evidence of predatory lenders targeting homeowners in their programs. They 
have not analyzed their foreclosure data for evidence that predatory lending has resulted in their 
homeowners losing their homes. All individuals participating in their programs are required to 
receive homeowner training before they receive their loans and the training curricula provided 
through local lenders has been expanded to educate participants about predatory lending 
practices. 
The South Carolina Human Affairs Commission  
The Human Affairs Commission reports no increase in fair housing complaints with 
predatory lending as the issue. They have not developed new programs in response to predatory 
lending practices but continue to address predatory lending as a fair housing issue in their work 
in the community. 
The South Carolina General Assembly 
Both the South Carolina House and Senate have introduced legislation to curb predatory 
lending practices. As of April 2003, the legislation was in a conference committee. The Senate 
bill addresses most of the practices itemized in the above description of predatory practices 
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including excessive fees, single premium credit insurance, loan flipping, traps, prepayment 
penalties and large balloon payments. 
The Affordable Housing Coalition of South Carolina 
In 2002, the Affordable Housing Coalition of South Carolina sponsored four educational 
workshops on predatory lending in Columbia, Beaufort, Greenville, and Florence. Participation 
ranged from 25-50 people. Panelists included representatives from Appleseed Legal Justice 
Center, the South Carolina Department of Consumer Affairs, Self-Help Credit Union (NC) and 
the AARP. 
 
ACTION PLAN TO ADDRESS THE IMPEDIMENTS 
1. Impediment: There are limited data available on the extent and characteristics of predatory 
lending in South Carolina.  
2. Impediment: The general public lacks information about predatory lending and the 
complexity of the issue and the number of overseeing agencies may make it difficult for 
individuals to access information or file complaints. 
3. Impediment: State resources for regulation enforcement and education are limited. 
 
Action Goal: Distribute this Amendment to the Analysis of Impediments in order to foster 
discussion and cooperation among agencies responsible for eliminating predatory practices, such 
as consumer education, consumer law enforcement, and affordable housing agencies. 
Action Goal: Pending legislation in South Carolina on predatory lending, develop a plan to 
respond to the issue by convening agencies with consumer law enforcement, consumer education 
and affordable housing responsibilities to review current practices toward predatory lending 
prevention and enforcement. 
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Action Goal: Increase knowledge of predatory practices among relevant agencies and consumers 
in order to enhance their capacity to identify, prevent and respond to predatory practices. For 
example, housing agencies could investigate ways to structure or write loans with protections 
that prevent or alert consumers to risks of refinancing. Agencies could sponsor periodic in-house 
training to keep abreast of current forms of predatory practices in South Carolina.  Consumer 
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